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CoRPORATIONS-SBCURITIES ACT OF 1933-STOCK SALB TO EMPLOYEES AS A
OFFER-The Securities and Exchange Commission sued to enjoin defendant corporation from offering stock for sale to its employees without first complying with tlie registration requirements1 of the Securities Act of 1933. Defendant claimed that its offer was not a public offer and therefore it came under a
class of transactions which were exempt2 from the registration requirements. The
offer was made to about 500 of the company's 7,000 employees. The company
classified the offer as one made only to ''key employees." The court of appeals
affirmed3 the trial court's judgment4 for defendant. On certiorari, held, reversed, two justices dissenting. 5 In the absence of a showing that the employees
to whom the stock was offered had knowledge making the protection of the act
unnecessary, this was a public offer and therefore the registration requirements
of the Securities Act of 1933 had to be fulfilled. Securities & Exchange Commission 11. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 73 S.Ct. 981 (1953).
Since the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 the problem of what constitutes a public offering has been a difficult one for the courts, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and corporations contemplating limited stock offers.
The courts have· never been inclined to accept the view that in order to have
a public offering the offer must be made to the populace at large. 6 But having
PUBLIC

148 Stat. L. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §77(e), provides that unless a registration
statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful to use the mails for buying or
selling the security.
248 Stat. L. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. (1946) §77(d), provides that §77(e) shall not
apply to any transactions by an issuer not involving a "public offering."
a SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., (8th Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 85.
4 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., (D.C. Mo. 1952) 102 F. Supp. 964, noted 51 lVhCH. L.
Rsv. 597 (1953).
5 Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Burton dissented without opinion. Justice Jackson
did not participate in the case.
6"• • • the word public 'is one familiar to everyone, but of the most varied and indefinite connotations. In its broadest meaning the term "public" distinguishes the populace
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rejected this standard they have found themselves groping for an adequate
alternative. In an early advisory opinion the Securities Division of the Federal
Trade Commission ventured to say that an offering to fewer than twenty-five
persons usually would not be a public offering.7 Far from lifting the fog, this
only added to the confusion because corporations tried to avoid the intent of the
law by offering large blocks of securities to limited numbers of individuals and
to insurance companies. The SEC attacked these schemes but often was at
a loss for standards by which to adjudge the transaction a public offer. However, the government was favored when the burden was placed on the corporations to prove that their prospective issues of securities did not involve an
offer to the public.8 The courts also said that the statute would be strictly
construed against corporations because they were claiming under an exception
to the general policy of the act. 9 The SEC won a further advantage when
it was ruled that the commission's interpretation of what constitutes a public
offering is entitled to great evidentiary weight.10 The general counsel for the
SEC has issued a list of factors to be considered in determining whether a
securities offer is made to the public.11 These standards are broad enough to
fit nearly" every case which the commission might want to prosecute, but as
a result they lack any great amount of meaning. What is the present attitude
of the courts in cases involving the question of public offer? Due to the vagueness of the commission's criteria, the courts apparently have not gone too far
in using them as standards. Instead they have adhered to the prior rules of
(1) putting the burden of proving the exception on the corporation, (2) construing the statute against the corporation, and (3) giving great weight to the
SEC determination.12 But the courts' ultimate standard seems to be one not
strictly called for by the language of the act. The result in a given case now
depends primarily on whether or not the court decides that the offerees are in
need of the information which is required to be supplied in connection with
registration.13 This bears no particular relation to the question of whether
at large from groups of individual members of the public segregated because of some
common interest or characteristic. Yet such a distinction is inadequate for practical purposes. • • .'" SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., (9th Cir. 1938) 95 F. (2d) 699 at 701.
7

McCoRMicx, UNDERSTANDING THE SEcURITIEs ACT .AND THE S.E.C. 101 (1948).
s Campbell v. Degenther, (D.C. Pa. 1951) 97 F. Supp. 975; SEC v. Sunbeam Gold
Mines Co., note 6 supra.
9 SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., note 6 supra; Corporation Trust Co. v. Logan,
(D.C. Del. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 999.
10 Campbell v. Degenther, note 8 supra.
11 Counsel proposed four factors to be considered in determining whether securities
are exempt as not being a public offering. They are (I) the number of offerees and their
relationship to the issuer, (2) the number of units offered, (3) the size of the offering,
and (4) the manner of offering. Release No. 285, Jan. 24, 1935, quoted in 1 CCH FED,
SEc. LAw SERV, 1[2266.17.
12 See cited cases in notes 8, 9, and 10 supra.
18 In the 1934 amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 it was proposed to exempt
offers to employees. This was rejected because it was felt that employees may be in as
great a need for the protection afforded by the law as other members of the public. H. Rep.
No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d sess., p. 41 (1934). The courts rely on this congressional action
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there is an offer to the general public, since in one case a single offeree may
be in need of such knowledge whereas in another case 1,000 offerees may not be.
Nevertheless, the courts have not ceased paying lip service to the concept of
public offering, because of the possible constitutional problem involved if
registration were required before a private offering.14 This is not meant as
an attack on the courts' altered standard. For it is only by such a liberal reading
of the statutory terms that the courts have succeeded in giving proper recognition
to social and economic needs for which the legislature has not expressly provided.

Paul B. Campbell, S.Ed.

as evidence of a legislative intent that the judiciary solve the public offering problem by
applying a need-for-information test. Thus it has been held that registration must take
place even when the offer is restricted to present stockholders of the company, if there are
many such stockholders. Merger Mines Corp. v. Grismer, (9th Cir. 1943) 137 F. (2d)
335 (1,100 stockholders).
14 The original California blue sky law made no exception from the registration
requirements for cases where there was no public offering. The statute also left a wide
measure of discretion in the commissioner as to whether he would issue a permit. This law
was declared unconstitutional as a contravention of the inalienable right to acquire, possess,
enjoy, and protect property. The law would have required a permit prior to a private sale
of securities. People v. Pace, 73 Cal. App. 548, 238 P. 1089 (1925).

